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1． Introduction
In the earlier paper（Aono（2015））, we integrated a land asset market into the
economic growth model and examined the characteristics of the steady state growth
path. In the previous paper（Aono（2016））, we examined the stability of the long-
run steady state path, and investigate the paths which do not converge to the long-
run steady state in greater detail. In this paper, we ask what happens when we
impose unrealized capital gains tax on land.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section2 outlines the basic
structure of the model, and derives the dynamic equations of the economy. Section
3 examines the characteristics of the equilibrium growth paths in the case where
unrealized capital gains tax on land is imposed. Section4 summarizes the main
results in this paper, and discusses possible extensions.
2． Model
2．1．The basic model
The basic model and notation in this paper are as follows.
＊ Former Professor/Matsuyama University, Dr. Economics（Kobe University）
1）This paper is a revised version of Aono（1976）. In this paper we mainly focus on the effects
of capital gains on land from the view point of equity and efficiency.
⒜ Technology.
Output, Y is a function of inputs of labor, N , capital, K , and land, L . The
production function for this output is twice differential, homogeneous of degree one,
in addition, it has the following properties : ⅰ positive and diminishing marginal
productivities of the three factors, ⅱ impossibility of any product without one of the
factors. Technical change is assumed to be land-augmenting and labor-augmenting.
The rate of land-augmenting technical progress and the rate of labor-augmenting
technical progress are denoted as h and α , respectively. The above assumptions are
summarized by
 ⑴
 ⑵
 ⑶
⒝ The supply of land and labor.
Land is assumed to be fixed in supply, and labor is assumed to grow at the
given exponential rate, n . Thus the sum of the rate of labor-augmenting technical
progress and the rate of growth of labor is . We assume that the following
conditions are satisfied.




: constant, ⑷
 ⑸
 ⑹
⒞ Land asset market
Consider first a new portfolio equation when an unrealized capital gains tax is
imposed on land. Denoting the rate of the unrealized capital gains tax as τ ,
landowners expect 	
 capital gains on land in each period when they hold
land. For analytical simplicity, we assume that there exists a perfect land asset
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market. Portfolio equilibrium requires that alternative investment options yield the
same net rate of return. Since capital is the only asset other than land, and since
these two assets have the same risk properties under the assumption of a perfect land
asset market, we obtain the following equilibrium condition ;








 ⑺
where P is the price of land in terms of goods,  is the expected change of land
prices,  is the expected rent of land, and  is the expected rate of return on
capital. The equation ⑺ tells us that the land asset market is in equilibrium when
the expected rate of yield in land prices,  plus the expected rent-price
ratio, are equal to the expected rate of return on capital, .
For simplicity, we assume that expected and actual price changes are identical,
i. e.






 ⑻
It is important to consider the implications and the limitations of the equation
⑺ and ⑻. We do not assume that landowners have a long-run perfect foresight
because they do not know what will happen in the long and distant future. We
assume that landowners adjust their expectations instantaneously for analytical
simplicity.
⒟ Consumption function and savings function
We now consider a new consumption function, and hence the savings function.
We shall assume that landowners consume or save out of capital gains minus the
capital gains tax on landand that the revenues out of the capital gains tax
on land are spent on consumption or investment. We also assume a generalized
Cambridge savings function instead of a proportional savings function. For
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analytical simplicity, we assume that workers do not own their land, and that they
do not have to pay the rental rate of land to landowners. Denote the rate of
government savings as . Then, we get a new consumption function ;
	

with  ⑼
where : the saving rate of capitalists（entrepreneurs）out of profits,  : the
saving rate of workers, : the saving rate of landowners out of rents, : the
saving rate of landowners out of capital gains minus the capital gains tax on land.
δ : the rate of depreciated capital. r : the net rate of return on capital, R : the real
wage rate, ρ : the rental rate of land.
Since total output, Y is equal to consumption, C plus capital depreciation,
δK , plus net investment, , we get
 ⑽
Substituting ⑼ into ⑽ yields
	

with  ⑾
⒠ Determination of factor prices.
Given R , ρ and the production function which is homogeneous of degree one
（exhibits constant returns to scale）, a competitive producer can maximize the net
rate of return on capital when the marginal productivities of capital, , labor, 

and land,  are equal to, R , and ρ respectively. Thus, we get
 ⑿

	 ⒀
 ⒁
160 松山大学論集 第29巻 第2号
2．2．Derivation of dynamic equations
It turns out that the dynamics of economy can best be described in terms of the
ratios, , and .
From the equation ⑴, we obtain
	



Thus, letting 	, the production function can be rewritten as a function of k
and u .
 ⒂
Differentiating the above equation with respect to K , and , we get

 ⒃

 ⒄

 ⒅
For analytical simplicity, we shall assume that u is constant. Since ,
the assumption implies that technical change is of such a character that the rate of
land-augmenting technical progress is equal to the sum of the rate of growth of labor
supply and the rate of labor-augmenting technical progress. Thus, 
, 
 and 

can be written as a function of k.
Differentiating with respect to time t , we get


 ⒆
where ,  . Substituting ⑺ and ⑻ into ⒆, and using ⑶, ⑷, ⑸,
⑿, ⒁, ⒂, ⒃ and ⒅, we obtain






 
 





  ⒇
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We shall now derive . From the definition of , we get


 21
From the equation ⑾, we obtain
 	






 

 	

	



Using ⑷, ⑿, ⒀, ⒁,  and , the above equation can be
rewritten as
	





 	
	


 22
Also, can be rewritten as


	


  23
Substituting 23 into 22 and using ⒃, ⒄ and ⒅, we get
	





	


 

	


 

 24
Substitute 24 into 21, we obtain
		
			 25
The dynamic behavior of the system is thus described by ⒇ and 25.
162 松山大学論集 第29巻 第2号
3． Characteristics of the equilibrium growth paths in the
case where unrealized capital gains tax on land is
imposed
3．1．The equilibrium growth path when there is no capital gains tax
In this section, we shall examine some qualitative properties of the equilibrium
growth path in the case where unrealized capital gains tax on land is imposed. For
this purpose, we first examine the equilibrium growth path in the case where capital
gains tax is not imposed.
Letting in ⒇, we get the curve :



 26’
It is easily verified that 26’ has the following properties.

	

	


 27’


 28’
and


 29’
In the case where , . Therefore, in Figure 1, along the
vertical line , there is no change in k. Above the curve, l
increases, below it, l decreases.
We now examine the curve and its properties. Letting in 25, we
get the curve :

				
		
 30’
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Differentiating 30’ with respect to k, we derive the formula for the slope of the
curve :





					 31’
Since the denominator is positive, it follows that the sign of 31’ depends only upon
the numerator. Although the numerator is unsigned, we see that 
 for

and that the curve meets the k-axis（see 30’）.
From 30’ we also see that the curve is at its maximum level at , the
height of the curve at , where, as Figure1makes clear, is defined by :

		

 32’
Above the curve, k decreases, below it, k increases.
As Figure1 shows, the curve is the inverted U shaped locus, the  
curve cuts the curve from below and there is a unique equilibrium.（see（Aono
（2016b）Figure1. Phase diagram of the dynamic behavior of the system.）
We examined the stability of the long-run steady state path, and investigated the
paths which do not converge to the long-run steady state in greater detail.）
3．2．The equilibrium growth path when capital gains tax is imposed
3．2．1．In the case where the revenues out of the capital gains tax on land
are spent on consumption
We shall now examine the properties of the equilibrium growth path when
capital gains tax is imposed. Firstly, we assume that the revenues out of the capital
gains tax on land are entirely spent on consumption（
）. The dynamic
behavior of the system can be illustrated in a phase diagram, as in Figure1. In
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order to examine the equilibrium growth path, we first derive the  curve.
From ⒇, we see that and if and only if



 26
It is easily verified that 26 has the following properties.

	




 27


 28

	
 29
In the case where 	, 	. Therefore, in Figure1,
along the vertical line 	there is no change in k. Above
the curve, l increases, below it, l decreases.
We now examine the curve and its properties. From 25, we get the
curve :

		
	
30
Differentiating 30 with respect to k, we derive the formula for the slope of the
curve :

	

	



			31
Since the denominator is positive, it follows that the sign of 31 depends only upon
the numerator. Although the numerator is unsigned, we see that  for
and that the curve meets the k-axis（see 30）. From 31 we also see
that the curve is at its maximum level at , the height of the curve at
, where, as Figure1makes clear,  is defined by :
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
		

32
Above the curve, k decreases, below it, k increases.
As Figure1 shows, unrealized capital gains tax on land shifts the curve
upwards, and curve downwards, the consequence is that the equilibrium value
of capital-labor ratio increases, but the effect on the equilibrium price of land is
ambiguous, i. e.





The above results are verified from ⒇ and 25.
Consider now the economic implications of the above results. The
consumption out of capital gains,  leads to a decrease in
investment, . Since a capital gains tax on land implies a decrease in the
consumption out of capital gains, it leads to the increase in the equilibrium capital-
labor ratio. The increase in the equilibrium capital-labor ratio increases the rental
rate of land and decreases the net rate of return on capital, and in doing so, has the
effect of raising the equilibrium price of land. But at the same time, this effect is
partially offset by the decrease in the expected capital gains of landowners due to a
tax on unrealized capital gains. Thus, the effect on the equilibrium price of land is
ambiguous.
3．2．2．In the case where the revenues out of the capital gains tax on land
are spent on investment
Let us examine when the revenues are spent on investment. The curve is
unchanged, it only alter the curve. Denote the rate of government savings as
. Assuming that government savings are directed to investment, and considering
25, we get
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
		
 25’
Letting 	, we obtain


 25’’
When the revenues are spent on investment, the dynamic behavior of the system is
thus described by ⒇ and 25’’.
From 25, we get the curve :




30’’
Differentiating 30’’ with respect to k, and assuming  for analytical
simplicity, we derive the formula for the slope of the curve :
	







 31’’
Since the denominator is positive, it follows that the sign of 31’’ depends only upon
the numerator. Although the numerator is unsigned, we see that  for
and that the curve meets the k-axis（see 30’’）.
From 31’’ we also see that the curve is at its maximum level at , the
height of the curve at , where, as Figure1makes clear,  is defined
by :




 32’’
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Above the curve, k decreases, below it, k increases.
From 30’’, 31’’ and 32’’, when we assume the revenues are spent on investment
and that is positive, the curve is shifted up even more
（while the  curve is unchanged）, the consequence is that the equilibrium value
of capital-labor ratio increases even more. The effect on the equilibrium price of
land is ambiguous, i. e.

The above results are verified from ⒇’’ and 25’’.
l
 
 
E”
E’E



k
0 		
Figure1. Phase diagram of the system
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3．3．Stability of the Equilibrium Growth Path
We shall now examine the stability of the equilibrium growth path. In the
previous paper（Aono（2016））, we examined the stability of the long-run steady
state path and investigated the paths which do not converge to the long-run steady
state in greater detail when there is no unrealized capital gains tax on land. As long
as we assume that expected and actual price changes are identical, i. e.


, the following result has been showed. When landowners seek capital
gains on land and consume out of the capital gains, the equilibrium point is a saddle
point, and the dynamic behavior of the system has been illustrated in a phase
diagram,（see Figure1 in the previous paper（Aono（2016））. Although unrealized
capital gains tax on land shifts the  curve upwards, and   curve
downwards, it does not change the stability properties of the equilibrium growth
path. i. e., the equilibrium pointis a saddle point.
In the following, we shall show that the equilibrium point is locally a
saddle point when the revenues out of the capital gains tax on land are entirely spent
on consumption, or on investment.
It is sufficient to prove that
 33











 
where

	


			

			



	

Economic Growth and Unrealized Capital Gains Taxation on Land 169




	
 is the Jacobian of the system ⒇ and 25 evaluated at the equilibrium point
.
It is verified that



	

	
			


 34
Consequently,

with  
	
	

.
Thus we have shown that the equilibrium pointis locally a saddle point
under the above assumption.
Letting in 34, we obtain



	

	
			


 34’
34’ shows that the equilibrium point is locally a saddle point when the revenues out
of the capital gains tax on land are entirely spent on consumption.
Letting in 34, we obtain



	

	
			


 34’’
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34’’ shows that the equilibrium point is locally a saddle point when the revenues out
of the capital gains tax on land are entirely spent on investment.
4． Effects of the increase in wealth on inequality and wealth-
income ratio when unrealized capital gains tax is imposed
4．1．Increase in wealth per capita and rising inequality
Let us examine whether the increase in wealth increases inequality or not. For
this purpose, we shall examine wealth per capita, and the wealth-income ratio on
the steady growth path when unrealized capital gains tax is imposed.
For simplicity, we assume that wealth consists of two components, capital and
land. The assumption is not so unrealistic as it might seem. Stiglitz（2015a）
asserts that“The most important source of the disparity between the growth of
wealth and the growth of productive capital is land : much of the increase in wealth
is an increase in the value of land－not associated with any increase in the amount
of land”（pp.2）.
Letting w denote wealth per capita, and considering 26, we get






	

	

 35
Whether landowners seek capital gains on land or not, w increases more than k.
Furthermore, from equation 35, when they seek capital gains on land, w increases
much more than k. This is because when landowners seek capital gains on land,
the denominator, 	 of the right hand side of 35 becomes
smaller and dominant.
Let us compare the wealth per capita, w , along the steady growth path when
unrealized capital gains tax is imposed with the wealth per capita when there is no
capital gains tax. Since the denominator, 	of the
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right hand side of 34 becomes smaller and dominant, if , it is
plausible that the wealth per capita without capital gains taxincreases more
than the wealth per capita with unrealized capital gains tax on land . In
other words, if , it is plausible that unrealized capital gains tax on
land decreases the disparity of the wealth per capita.
4．2．Wealth-income ratio on the steady growth path
Let us examine the wealth-income ratio along the steady growth path.
Denotting γ as the wealth-income ratio along the steady growth path, γ is given by




	








 36
Differentiating 36 with respect to k, we obtain







 







〔		

		





	
	〕. 37
Since , as long as	 , γ increases more than k. Furthermore,
from 37, when landowners seek capital gains on land, w increases much more
than k.
Let us compare the wealth-income ratio, γ , along the steady growth path when
unrealized capital gains tax is imposed with the wealth-income ratio when there is no
capital gains tax. Since the denominator, 		of the
right hand side of 35 becomes smaller and dominant, if , it is
plausible that the wealth-income ratio without capital gains tax increases
more than the wealth per capita with unrealized capital gains tax on land .
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In other words, if , it is plausible that unrealized capital gains tax
on land decreases the disparity of the wealth-income ratio.
5． Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a neoclassical economic growth model with
unrealized capital gains tax on land, and examined the characteristics and the
stability of the long-run steady state paths. We have shown the following results.
First, unrealized capital gains tax on land increases the equilibrium value of capital-
labor ratio, but the effect on the equilibrium price of land is ambiguous. The
economic implications of the above results are as follows. Since a capital gains tax
on land implies a decrease in the consumption out of capital gains, it leads to the
increase in the equilibrium capital-labor ratio. The increase in the equilibrium
capital-labor ratio increases the rental rate of land and decreases the net rate of return
on capital, and in doing so, has the effect of raising the equilibrium price of land.
But at the same time, this is partially offset by the decrease in the expected capital
gains of landowners due to a tax on unrealized capital gains, and in doing so, has
the effect of reducing the equilibrium price of land. Thus, the effect on the
equilibrium price of land is ambiguous.
Let us compare the equilibrium value of capital-labor ratio when the revenues
out of the capital gains tax on land are entirely spent on consumption with the
equilibrium capital-labor ratio when the revenues out of the capital gains tax on land
are entirely spent on investment. It is shown that the equilibrium capital-labor ratio
of the latter is higher than that of the former.
Second, as long as we assume that expected and actual price changes are
identical, unrealized capital gains tax on land does not change the stability properties
of the equilibrium growth path, i. e., the equilibrium point is a saddle point. The
reason is as follows. Although unrealized capital gains tax on land has the effect of
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decreasing the expected capital gains on land, we assume that expected and actual
price changes are identical. Therefore, the increase in the actual rate of land prices
raises the expected rate of land price, and in doing so, raises the expected capital
gains on land. Thus, as long as we assume that expected and actual price changes
are identical, unrealized capital gains tax on land does not change the stability
properties of the equilibrium growth path.
Third, comparing the wealth per capita and the wealth-income ratio along the
steady growth path when unrealized capital gains tax is imposed with the wealth per
capita and the wealth-income ratio when there is no capital gains tax, it is plausible
that unrealized capital gains tax on land decreases the disparity of the wealth per
capita and the wealth-income ratio.
Two extensions of our model are being considered. First, we have examined
the effects of unrealized capital gains taxation on land. However, most countries
have opted for a realization-based capital gains tax on land. Perhaps significant
arguments against unrealized capital gains taxation on land are that unrealized capital
gains taxation on land makes it necessary to evaluate unrealized capital gains on land
and that it would be extremely difficult to evaluate the unrealized increment of land
value. From the practical point of view, instead of imposing unrealized capital
gains tax on land, it is necessary to propose a new method of taxation on land.
Proposing a new method of taxation on land is left for future research.
Second, in this paper, we assumed that expected and actual price changes are
identical. The result is that unrealized capital gains tax on land does change the
stability properties of the equilibrium growth path, i. e. the equilibrium point is a
saddle point. What happens if we assume that expected and actual price changes
are not identical ? This is an interesting research topic for the future.
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